Policy

Do China's Moon base plans undermine the Outer Space Treaty?

China's entrenched ties with Russia and implicit support for its war in Ukraine have led to European apprehension about cooperation with Beijing and its follow-on associations with Moscow.

A still from a video released by the China National Space Administration (CNSA) that outlines its concept for a lunar base to be developed by 2036. [CNSA]
A still from a video released by the China National Space Administration (CNSA) that outlines its concept for a lunar base to be developed by 2036. [CNSA]

By BlueShift |

China and Russia's plan to build a nuclear-powered lunar base could undermine key principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), space observers say.

The base, officially known as the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), is slated for completion by 2036 and is expected to be built near the Moon's south pole.

Although framed as a peaceful scientific endeavor, the ILRS could effectively constitute a de facto territorial claim over resource-rich lunar terrain, an act that would directly conflict with Article II of the OST, which prohibits any nation from appropriating celestial bodies.

The use of nuclear energy and dual-use infrastructure further raises concerns about the potential militarization of the Moon under the guise of research collaboration.

The ILRS will be built near permanently shadowed regions where stores of helium-3, a rare heavy isotope, and of water ice have been identified. These resources will be crucial for generating energy and for sustaining any long-term human presence on the Moon.

China sees space as a domain of strategic competition, particularly with the United States.

In space exploration and research, China can flex its science and technology muscles while elevating itself as a major player and partner of choice for smaller states.

Many smaller economies have space-based ambitions of their own but have limited ability to conduct independent space-based research.

China's entrenched ties with Russia and implicit support for its war in Ukraine have led to European apprehension about cooperation with China and its follow-on associations with Russia.

Questions about international agreements

Russia and China announced plans to develop a nuclear power plant during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow May 7-10, further cementing their public image of cooperation.

The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding laying the groundwork for construction of a lunar reactor in an effort to provide a reliable energy source for the ILRS's operations.

The assertive maneuver raises questions about potential violations of the OST of 1967. China and Russia are signatories to the OST, which establishes key principles for space activities.

The construction of a lunar base could violate several OST principles, including Article II, which outlines non-appropriation of celestial bodies. The text stipulates that outer space, including the Moon, may not be subject to claims of sovereignty by any nation. It specifically prohibits occupation.

The OST also outlines that celestial bodies should be used only for peaceful purposes. If the ILRS and its research end up enhancing China and Russia's terrestrial or orbital military capabilities, it could raise alarm among OST signatories.

While the nuclear power source slated for the ILRS would be for civilian uses, the potential for dual military use or of a retrofit for military purposes presents concerns.

China has been engaging in increasingly aggressive maneuvers to militarize space. The Secure World Foundation's latest Global Counterspace Capabilities report, released April 3, noted that China is believed to have at least one direct-ascent anti-satellite system.

China's ongoing Guowang satellite megaconstellation -- which seeks to put 14,000 satellites in low-earth orbit (LEO) -- has raised concerns about orbital collisions and excessive orbital congestion.

Beijing's accelerating efforts to assert itself in space have already raised international concerns and point to routine disregard for international conventions.

Last August, a Long March rocket malfunctioned and created a massive debris field after it deployed 18 Qianfan satellites in LEO. This is not the first time a Long March rocket has malfunctioned while in flight, producing a dangerous debris field that threatens traveling spacecraft and those in orbit.

International reaction

The ILRS is more than just a scientific research project; it is a geopolitical signal about the importance of space to the future of international security and engagement.

China's efforts to assert dominance on the Moon's surface suggest its willingness to compete for primacy in space.

Other nations are reacting to China's ILRS plans with a mix of strategic concern, competitive acceleration and, in some cases, collaboration.

The United States has spearheaded the Artemis Accords, an effort to promote an alternative lunar governance framework that underscores principles of transparency, interoperability and responsible behavior.

The Accords are related to the US-led Artemis program, which aims to return humans to the Moon by 2027, with the ultimate goal of expanding space exploration to Mars and beyond.

To date, 55 countries have signed the Accords, which NASA and the US Department of State drafted in 2020.

Wu Weiren, the chief designer of the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program, accused the United States of actively discouraging other nations from joining the ILRS.

The European Space Agency (ESA) has cautiously distanced itself from China despite initial exploration of cooperation on lunar projects.

A confluence of concerns about China's proximity to Russia, hesitation regarding Chinese policies and interest in aligning with the United States and the Artemis Accords have influenced this choice.

Meanwhile, 17 countries have seized on the opportunity to leverage China's willingness to invest in space exploration and joined the ILRS.

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